Brian Gongol
Game theory provides a useful method for predicting the likely outcomes of future events. With North Korea threatening to test a long-range nuclear weapon, it is useful to apply this method in order to predict the possible outcomes. The first action is shown in the left-hand column, so each of the following starts with North Korea's first move, followed by the possible US responses:
| US launches successful counter-measures | US launches unsuccessful counter-measures | US does nothing | US launches preemptive airstrikes with UN approval | US launches preemptive airstrikes without UN approval | |
| NK launches successful test |
US establishes that it has an effective deterrent
US unlikely to engage in combative retaliation US likely to approach UN for approval to launch airstrikes |
US reputation damaged
Gives NK pretext to launch aggressions against SK |
NK attracts diplomatic attention and gravity equal to that being paid to Iran | (not applicable) | (not applicable) |
| NK launches successful attack against foreign target |
Combat ensues with massive retaliation
US forces already spread thin due to engagements in Iraq, Afghanistan |
US reputation damaged
Combat ensues with massive retaliation US forces already spread thin due to engagements in Iraq, Afghanistan |
Virtually impossible to conceive | (not applicable) | (not applicable) |
| NK launches unsuccessful test |
US establishes that it has an effective deterrent
NK may try to seize pretext for aggression against SK US likely to approach UN for airstrikes against NK nuclear targets Kim Jong-Il may conduct a purge of his domestic and military leadership |
US reputation damaged
US less likely to pursue airstrikes against NK nuclear targets than if test had been successful Kim Jong-Il may conduct a purge of his domestic and military leadership |
NK forces other nations to negotiate and/or supply aid
US may approach UN for approval to launch airstrikes Kim Jong-Il may conduct a purge of his domestic and military leadership |
(not applicable) | (not applicable) |
| NK does nothing | (not applicable) | (not applicable) | NK forces other nations to negotiate and/or supply aid |
Better chance of success than if delayed by wait for UN approval
More difficult for US to win allies than if UN approval is granted May damage US reputation May sufficiently destabilize Kim Jong-Il to lead to internal power struggles and possible coup |
High probability that NK will use human shields, since transparency of a UN debate would give NK time to organize
May sufficiently destabilize Kim Jong-Il to lead to internal power struggles and possible coup |
Some observations that arise from this analysis:
- North Korea probably won't launch a test unless it's virtually certain to work
- The United States has a constrained set of choices; the most effective action would probably be pre-emptive airstrikes, but the US probably doesn't have enough international goodwill to take that action
- If the United States acts in any way to respond after a test is conducted, it generally plays into the hands of Kim Jong-Il
- North Korea "wins" just by threatening to test a missile